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BALAAM AS THE SOPHIST PAR EXCELLENCE IN
PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA:
PHILO'S PROJECTION OF AN URGENT
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE ONTO MOSES'
PENTATEUCHAL NARRATIVES
In Philo's commentaries on Moses' Pentateuch, one of the figures dealt
with in some detail is Balaam.! As we shall see, Philo regards Balaam
as quite an important figure. He portrays him as a sophist, for reasons
which we shall explore in the first section (§ I). From the fifth century Be
on, the word 'sophist' was applied, in a technical sense, to the itiner-
ant professors of higher education who travelled widely through the
Greek world and gave lectures for which they could charge a large fee.
According to a definition by Christopher Taylor,
They pioneered the systematic study of techniques of persuasion and argu-
ment, which embraced various forms of the study of language, including
grammar, literary criticism, and semantics. Protagoras was reputedly the
first person to write a treatise on techniques of argument, and was notori-
ous for his claim to 'make the weaker argument the stronger'. The sophists
aroused strong reactions, both positive and negative. On the positive side,
the highly successful careers of the most celebrated testify to a consider-
able demand for their services, especially in providing rhetorical training
for aspiring politicians. On the negative, they were regarded, especially
by those of conservative views, as subversive of morality and tradition,
in view (... ) of their teaching (especially to the young) of techniques of
argument. (... ) Plato (... ) depicts the sophists predominantly as charlatans,
in contrast to Socrates, the paradigm of the true philosopher. 2
The same antithesis between sophistry and true philosophy runs through
Philo's writings. By anachronistically attributing the term 'sophist' to
past opponents of Israel, Philo rewrites the history of Israel in philo-
sophical terms. Balaam is but one example of the sophists whom Philo
I I wish to thank Dr Maria Sherwood-Smith (Leiden) for her kindness in revising
the English in this paper.
2 C.C.W. Taylor, 'Sophists', in: S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth (eds), The Oiford
ClassicalDictionary~7hird Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 1422.
mentions. As a sophistic adversary oflsrael, who appears during Israel's
voyage through the wilderness, Balaam is, chronologically speaking,
the last representative of sophistic philosophy in Moses' Pentateuch
and takes his place in a long succession of sophists who contend with
the ancestors and descendants of the Jewish people. The way in which
Philo construes this archetypal conflict between sophistry and Israel will
be discussed in the second section (§2).
In his treatment of Balaam and other sophists, Philo shows himself to
be anything but detached. As a matter of fact, Philo's grave concerns
about the threat posed to true philosophy by sophists in his own day
repeatedly emerge from the text in a very vivid manner. The atten-
tion Philo pays to sophistry is not the expression of an antiquarian
interest in Greek philosophy, but rather reflects his concern about the
contemporary movement known as the Second Sophistic, which, in
the first three centuries AD, revived the spirit of the classical sophists.
The Second Sophistic, which has recently been put on the scholarly
agenda by many classicists,3 flourished in Rome and in the cities of
the Eastern Mediterranean, including Alexandria where Philo worked
and lived. It was a public phenomenon:
Rhetors (prl"tope~),whether resident teachers of rhetoric or touring emi-
nences, would draw aficionados in large numbers to private or imperial
mansions, lecture halls in libraries, bouleuteria, odeia, and even theatres.4
These rhetoricians were active in public declamation and teaching, but
also in the arena of civic and political life:
Many sophists (... ) were influential in their cities and even provinces,
intervening to check civic disorder or inter-city rivalry (... ), or dispatched
as envoys to congratulate emperors on their accession or to win or secure
privileges for their cities (and often themselves).5
The distinctions they could procure in the public sphere rendered
their profession quarrelsome and very competitive. It is against the
3 See, e.g., T. Whitmarsh, the Second Sophistic (New Surveys in the Classics 35), Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005;B.E. Borg (ed.), Paideia: TIe World qfthe Second Sophistic
(Millennium Studies 2);Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004; G. Anderson,
TIe Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire, London/New York:
Routledge, 1993;G.W. Bowersock, GreekSophists in the Roman Empire, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1969.
4 E.L. Bowie, 'Second Sophistic', in: Hornblower & Spawforth, TIe O:ifiJrd Classical
Dictionary, 1377-8 at 1377.
5 Bowie, 'Second Sophistic', 1377.
lure of this rhetorical movement that Philo wishes to warn his read-
ers. It may well be that Philo's treatment of contemporary sophistry
offersan important key to his entire oeuvre-commentaries which may
otherwise appear to be abstract, monotonous, difficult and unfocused
philosophical musings on the books of Moses. As I shall argue, Balaam,
along with other adversaries from Israel's past, functions as a chiffre of
the (perceived) attack of sophistry on Philo's Platonic philosophy, thus
giving a concrete and realistic urgency to Philo's scholarly work. Philo's
application of Moses' writings to his own polemical circumstances,
and the way he transposes the philosophical controversies of his day
back into narratives contained in those writings will be examined in
the third section (§3).
The issue of Philo and the sophists of contemporary Alexandria was
already taken up by Bruce Winter in his exemplary study Philo and Paul
Among the Sophists (1997).6To my mind, the study constituted a break-
through in Philonic and Pauline studies by applying the new insights
into the movement of the Second Sophistic to contemporary Judaism
(Philo) and Christianity (Paul) and contextualizing the opponents in
both Philo's writings and Paul's Corinthian correspondence. Prior to
Winter's study we lacked a thorough survey of Philo's discussion of the
sophists, and his many comments on the sophistic movement seem to
have been neglected.7 Before pointing out a desideratum not fulfilled
by Winter's study, I shall briefly outline the structure of his book. In
the chapters devoted to Philo, Winter first raises the question 'Who are
Philo's Sophists?' Before Winter, views varied considerably in scholarly
literature. Winter carefully reviews all existing definitions by modern
scholars, deals with the relevant passages from Philo's writings and, on
the basis of that, criticizes most modern definitions, to conclude 'that
Philo denotes contemporary, professional orators and sophists in Alexan-
dria. Other first-century writers such as Plutarch, Epictetus and Dio
Chrysostom likewise refer to both groups as a sort of contemporary,
identifiable and professional guild'. 8
6 B.W. Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists:Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses to
a ]ulio-Claudian Movement-Second Edition, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 2002
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19971).
7 C£Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, 59, 59nl, 62.
8 Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, chap. 3, 59-79 at 66. Earlier modern
definitions are listed on pp. 60-2 and critically reviewed on pp. 62-78.
In his final conclusion, Winter offers the following assessment, in
which he underscores the specialized, technical, literal meaning of the
term 'sophist' in Philo and its reference to the actual contemporary
movement of the Second Sophistic:
Orators and sophists comprised an identifiable grouping in Alexandrian
society (... ). Within the educational system of the first century, the term
'sophist' was not a fluid one: it excluded philosophers, dialecticians,
grammarians, musicians, geometricians and any other specialized group.
Philo's 'sophists' comprised a specific group within paideia (..).Philo
does not use the term 'sophist' to stigmatise philosophers (... ). The term
in Philo's corpus is neither a 'symbol' nor a pejorative label applied to
Greek or Jewish teachers or Greek philosophers. (... ) the word should be
read literally. Philo may well speak of the sophists in a pejorative way,
but like Dio, he does not use it pejoratively of non-sophists. A distinct
vocabulary of invective, drawn from Plato and well suited to its purpose,
was used of the actual sophists in the first century.9
On the basis of this terminological clarification, Winter is able to take
two further steps in the following chapters. First, Winter studies Philo's
critique of the Alexandrian sophistic tradition by offering a systematic
analysis of Philo's characterizations and criticism of the sophists, and
commenting on their misuse ofpaideia for vice, deception, and personal
gain. 10Whereas Winter's analysis of the comments themselves is system-
atic, he fails to pay sufficient attention to the original narrative setting
of Philo's criticisms within his commentaries on the Mosaic Pentateuch,
so that the full import of Philo's criticism is lost.
Secondly, having now established both the definition of 'sophists' and
Philo's criticism of these sophists, Winter shows how Philo prepared
himself and the ablest among his readers for the arduous debate with
and defeat of the sophists.l
Despite the ground-breaking qualities of Winter's study, one impor-
tant aspect of Philo's polemics with the sophists is not sufficiently illu-
minated: the scope and range of Philo's projection of the contemporary
debate with the sophists onto the narratives of the Mosaic Pentateuch,
on which his writings offer a running commentary. My own research
into the sophists in Philo's corpus of texts throws more light on this
9 Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, 7S-9.
10 Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, chap. 4, S0--94.
II Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, chap. 5, 95-[OS.
aspect. Apart from yielding some extra passages on the sophists not
drawn upon by Winter,12 my enquiry into the narrative context of
Balaam the Sophist and into that of other 'sophists' in Philo's commen-
taries on the Pentateuch shows that Philo envisaged an uninterrupted
threat posed to Israel's history by sophistry. Winter occasionally refers
to the narrative settings of Philo's criticism of the sophists and to the
way these narratives function,13but never highlights them, due to his
systematic, non-narrative treatment of the contents of this criticism. By
divorcing the polemic from its narrative, biblical context he also fails to
point out important narratives and does not mention the anti-sophistic
contestants by their biblical names.14
Within the Mosaic writings the sophistic threat reached its climax,
in Philo's eyes, in the figure of Balaam (§ I), as the culmination of
sophistic encounters right from the start of creation (§2).By construct-
ing a persistent sophistic threat throughout the narratives of the Mosaic
Pentateuch, Philo seems to warn his (Jewish) readers not to yield to the
attractions of contemporary sophistry (§3). It shows another side, and
therefore a more complicated picture, of Philo of Alexandria. This is
the picture, not of a Hellenizing, 'secularizing' Jew, but of aJew who,
by adopting Greek philosophy, draws some demarcation lines against
the prevailing forces of the Second Sophistic.
In his commentary on Cain's murder of Abel, Philo draws a parallel
between the conduct of Cain and that of Balaam. According to Philo,
God's question to Cain, 'What have you done?' (Gen 4: 10),
is tantamount to 'You have done nothing, accomplishednothing'. It
was sowithBalaamalso.He wasa sophist,an emptyconglomerationof
12 See, e.g., De conjUsione 39;Legum allegoriae 1.74,3.41,3.54; De migratione 171-172;
De praemiis 8;De providentia, frag. 1.1;De somniis 1.102.
13 Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, 80, 94, 105, 107.
14 See, e.g., the narratives about the creation (De opijicio mundi 45;passage not in
Winter), Abraham (De praemiis 58;passage in Winter, 89n50 but without name of
Abraham), Rebecca (De posteritate Caini 150;in Winter, 92 but without reference to
section on Rebecca), Joseph (De Josepho 104, 125;passages in Winter, 88 and 64 but
without reference to Joseph), Moses (De conjUsione 33-35;passage not in Winter) and
the Amorites (Legum allegoriae 3.232-233; passage in Winter, 91 but without reference
to the Amorites).
incompatible and discordant notions (0 cro<ptcrtil~BaAaa!!, !!atato~ mv
OXAO~ EvavttWv Kat !!aXO!!EVWVoo~&v). It was his desire to do harm to
the goodly one by laying curses upon him. But he could not, for God
turned his curses into a blessing ... 15 (Qyod deterius 70-71)
Apparendy, Philo reads the story ofBalaam as that of a conflict between
Balaam's evil intentions ('his curses') and the outcome (their being turned
into blessings by God). In his exegesis of the Balaam narrative in Num-
bers 22-25, Philo is heavily dependent on its earliest interpretation in
Deut 23:4-6 (ef. Noort's contribution, §5b-i). There is an unresolved
tension between the positive picture of Balaam in Numbers 22-24 (he
refuses to be paid and wishes to speak only as God commands [22:7,
17-18,37-38; 23:12, 26;24:11-13]) on the one hand, and the unan-
ticipated reference in Numbers 31 to Balaam's harmful advice (31:16;
ef. 31:8) to weaken the Israelites by seducing them and inviting them
to idolatry (25:1-3a) on the other. Because of this tension, the author of
Deuteronomy assumes that Balaam had in fact been hired and intended
to curse Israel for gain, but was prevented by God who turned the curse
into a blessing (Deut 23:4-6;ef. Neh 13:2,Jude 11, 2 Pet 2:15). This
interpretation turned Balaam into a figure which, in a different context,
could be easily understood as a sophist avant la lettre.
This conflict of opposing movements of cursing and blessing in
Balaam renders him 'an empty conglomeration of incompatible and
discordant notions'-a periphrastic definition of what Philo understands
sophists to be. And indeed, as Philo continues:
Sophists are bound to find the powers within them at strife, words run-
ning counter to ideas and wishes to words, in absolute and utter discord
(1t£<puKacrtOe Ot cro<ptcrtat 1toA£!!iot~XPllcrOattat~ EVautot~ ouva!!£<Jt,
A.6ywvEVOU!!TtacrtKat ~ouAlwatWV A.6YOt~avttcrtatOUVtwV Kat !!T]Oa!!TI
!!T]Oa!!&~cr1lV~MVtwv).(Qyod deterius 72)
Although the sophists invest much energy in demonstrating both the
social character of righteousness and the unsociability of injustice, the
advantageous nature of moderation and self-control as well as the loss
of health due to a licentious life, the great benefits conferred by piety
as well as how irreligion makes one into a pariah, and the power of
'5 Translations of Philo have been taken from the Loeb Classical Library (F.H.
Colson, G.H. Whitaker & R. Marcus) with occasionally minor alterations when
needed.
virtue in bringing health and safety as well as the harm occasioned by
wickedness, the sophists themselves
nevertheless (... ) all the time entertain sentiments quite at variance with
the things they say. At the very moment that they are singing the praises
of good sense and moderation and righteousness and piety, they are found
more than ever to be practising foolishness, licentiousness, injustice, and
impiety, to be confounding and overturning, you may well nigh say,
every ordinance of God or man. To these men one might rightly put
the question (... ) 'What benefit have all these harangues on the subject
of virtue conferred on your own souls?(... ) Have you not furnished true
charges against yourselves, in that, while you have shown yourselves
lecturers of the highest order as far as understanding of beautiful things
and philosophical discourses are concerned, you are invariably caught
cherishing sentiments and indulging in practices that are utterly base?'
(Qyod deterius potiori insidiari soleat 73-75)
This sophistic ambivalence is symbolized in Balaam, who is charac-
terized as 'an empty conglomeration of incompatible and discordant
notions'. Balaam is no doubt called 'vain, empty, idle' because of the idle
words he intended to speak. Philo is keen to stress Balaam's vanity in a
number of passages in other treatises, even when he does not explicitly
repeat his charge that Balaam is a sophist in those writings. In De conft-
sione linguarum, Philo calls Balaam 'that dealer in auguries and prodigies
and in the vanity of unfounded conjectures' ('tOVyouv oiffivollavnv Kat
'tEpa'tO(JK01tOV1tEpt 'ta~ a~E~aiou~ dKa(Jia~ Ila'tatai;ov'ta), and relates
this to the etymology of his name: 'vain' (Katyap Ila'tato~ epllllvEuE'tat
BaAaall; 159). Balaam's vanity is demonstrated by the fact
that he cursed the Man of Vision [i.e. Moses], though in words he uttered
prayers of blessing, for it [i.e. Moses' law-book] considers not what he
actually said, words restamped under God's providence, like a true coin
substituted for the false, but his heart, in which he cherished thoughts
of injury rather than of benefit. There is a natural hostility between
conjecture and truth, between vanity and knowledge, and between the
divination which has no true inspiration and sound sober wisdom (De
conjUsione linguarum 159).
Balaam's vanity is clearly contrasted with true knowledge.
In De migratione Abrahami, this vanity is explained by an antithesis
between factual truth and rhetorical abilities. Philo argues that the
practice of praising someone in encomiums and the opposite act of
blaming are often not based on 'the truth of fact', but rest rather on
the falsely exercised rhetorical abilities of speakers and authors:
Do you not see the flatterers who by day and night batter to pieces and
wear out the ears of those whom they flatter, not content with just assent-
ing to everything they say, but spinning out long speeches and declaiming
and many a time uttering prayers with their voice, but never ceasing to
curse with their heart? (De migratione Abrahami Ill)
This, of course, is a description of what Philo regards as Balaam's hall-
mark and it is no surprise that he continues by referring to him. In
so doing Philo tries to make sense of the positive oracles of Balaam,
recorded in Numbers 23-24. Particularly striking, in Philo's eyes, is
Balaam's statement: 'God is not as man' (Num 23: 19)-a statement
Philo could only approve of. Yet, Balaam is to be blamed for his evil
intentions and these justify his being called 'empty':
Accordingly, that empty one, Balaam (6 ~atalO<;BaA.aa~), though he
sang loftiest hymns to God, among which is that most Divine of canticles
'God is not as man' (Num 23: 19), and poured out a thousand eulogies
on (... ) Israel, has been adjudged impious and accursed even by the wise
lawgiver, and held to be an utterer not of blessings but of curses. For
Moses says that as the hired confederate of Israel's enemies he became
an evil prophet of evil things, nursing in his soul direst curses on the race
beloved of God, but forced with mouth and tongue to give prophetic
utterance to most amazing benedictory prayers: for the words that were
spoken were noble words, whose utterance was prompted by God the
Lover of Virtue, but the intentions, in all their vileness, were the offSpring
of a mind that looked on virtue with loathing. (113-114)
In other treatises Philo repeats his explicit characterization of Balaam
as a sophist. In De mutatione nominum, Philo highlights Balaam's contra-
dictory performance vis-a.-vis Israel. Although Balaam, 'that dealer in
augury' (tOVOiroVOO"K61tovBaAaa/-l), is described, in the Septuagint, as
'hearing the oracles of God and knowing knowledge from the Most
High' (Num 24: 16), Philo points out that Balaam himself did not profit
from such knowledge but eventually perished in his own madness
because with his prophetic, oracular sophistry (O"o<ptO"1:Ei~/-lav1:tJell)he
was intent upon 'defacing the stamp of heaven-sent prophecy' (202-203).
As such it was no insult for the sophists of Philo's day to be compared
with oracular prophets. Philostratus, the second-century AD author of a
biographical compendium of sophists and himself a sophist, also drew
this comparison at the beginning of his work:
the sophistic method resembles the prophetic art of soothsayers and
oracles. For indeed one may hear the Pythian oracle say: 'I know the
number of the sands of the sea and the measure thereof', and 'Far-
seeing Zeus gives a wooden wall to the Trito-Born', and 'Nero, Orestes,
Alcmaeon, matricides', and many other things of this sort, just like a
sophist (Lives qf the Sophists 1.481 ).
The contrast Philo makes is rather between oracular sophistry and
prophecy concerned with real knowledge. It is apparent from Philo's
other works that he views true prophecy-such as that uttered by
Balaam at God's prompting--as Platonic in nature. In his treatise De
vita Mosis, for instance, in which he explicitly represents Balaam as
a sophist, there is an extensive paraphrase of the Balaam narrative
(1.263-293), even if Balaam is not mentioned by name. He is only
described as 'a man living in Mesopotamia far-famed as a soothsayer,
who had learned the secrets of that art in its every form, but was par-
ticularly admired for his high proficiency in augury'. 16 In this retelling,
Philo also gives the contents of some of Balaam's oracles, after he has
said that Balaam
became possessed and there fell upon him the truly prophetic Spirit
(1tpoCPll'ttlCQu1tVEl)lla'tOt;e1ttcpot'tlJcrav'tOt;)which banished utterly from his
soul his art of oracular prophecy (0 1tacrav au'tou 'tllv EV'tEXVOVllavnJci)v
iJ1tEPOPWV'tllt;'l''UXllt;iV"acrE). For the inspiration of the Holiest and
magical sophistry might not live together (8Elltt;yap OUIC~v tEPCO'tU'tll
ICa'toICcoxncr'Uvchm'tacr8m llaytJci)v crocptcr'tEtav).(1.277)
Under this influence Balaam speaks:
From Mesopotamia has Balak called me, a far journey from the East,
that he may avenge him on the Hebrews through my cursing. But I,
how shall I curse them whom God has not cursed? (... ) I shall not be
able to harm the people (... ). Who has made accurate discovery of how
the sowing of their generation was first made? Their bodies have been
16 This aspect of Philo's characterization of Balaam is spotlighted in H. Remus,
'Moses and the Thaumaturges: Philo's De Vita Mosis as a Rescue Operation', Laval
theologique et philosophique 52 (1996) 665-80;L.H. Feldman, 'Philo's Version of Balaam',
Henoch 25 (2003) 301-19;and T. Seland, 'Philo, Magic and Balaam: Neglected Aspects
of Philo's Exposition of the Balaam Story', in: J.Fotopoulos (ed.), The New Testament
and Early Christian Literature in Greco-Roman Context: Studies in Honor ifDavid E.Aune
(Supplements to Novum Testamentum 122), Leiden: Brill, 2006, 333-46. According
to Feldman, Philo 'sought to elevate the figure of Moses through contrasting him, the
true prophet, with this, the greatest of pagan prophets, who was actually a mere techni-
cian' (317);his De vita Mosis 'serves to rescue Moses from possible misunderstandings
of Moses as a mere thaumaturge or as a magician, a reputation attested in a variety
of [pagan]sources' (Remus, 665). Remus (666,671,674), Feldman (309) and Seland
(345-6) suggest 'that Philo sees contemporary Balaams as practicing their arts in the
streets and marketplaces of Alexandria' (Feldman). However, they seem to lose sight
of Philo's depiction of Balaam as a sophist (only briefly mentioned by Remus, 668,
672n34 and Feldman, 304, 318).
moulded from human seeds, but their souls are sprung from divine seeds,
and therefore their stock is akin to God (&toKat yeyovacrtv urxieJ7topOt
8fOU). (1.278-279)
As F.H. Colson pointed out, Philo probably derives this appraisal of
the Jews in terms of 'divine seeds' and 'being akin to God' from Plato,17
who, in his Republic, quotes the following lines from Aeschylus:
The near-sown seeds of gods (oi 8emv uYXieJ7toPOt),I Close kin to Zeus,
for whom on Ida's top I Ancestral altars flame to highest heaven, I Nor
in their life-blood fails the fire divine. (Aeschylus, Niobe;Plato, Republic
III 391£)
The passage in Philo about the origin of 'the Hebrews', which the
Septuagint lacks, may serve as a nice illustration of how the wording
of Balaam's oracles is slightly platonized so as to forge an antithesis
between Balaam the sophist and the God-inspired Balaam, who speaks
the language of Plato, the great anti-sophistic philosopher.
In his use of the Balaam narrative, Philo is predominantly interested
in the character of Balaam, and hardly mentions the episode of the
speaking ass. According to F.H. Colson, 'Philo's omission of any men-
tion of the ass speaking [in De vita Mosis 1.263-293]may no doubt be
due to the feeling that the story might seem ridiculous to the Gentile
readers, whom he certainly has in view'. 18Though this is a possible
explanation, there is some evidence to suggest that the episode of the
ass speaking to Balaam was already known to a wider Greek public.
According to the second-century Be Hermippus of Smyrna, in his De
Iythagora, Pythagoras remarked that Calliphon, a deceased disciple of
Pythagoras, had admonished him 'not to pass a certain spot, on which
an ass had collapsed, to abstain from thirst-producing water, and to
avoid all calumny.' This, as Hermippus added, wasJewish practice: 'In
practising and repeating these precepts he [i.e. Pythagoras]was imitat-
ing and appropriating the doctrines ofJews and Thracians. In fact, it
is actually said that that great man introduced many points of Jewish
law into his philosophy' (Josephus, Contra Apionem 1.162~165).19
17 F.H. Colson, Philo, vol. 6 (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press/London: Heinemann, 1935, 420-1 note b.
18 Colson, Philo, vol. 6, 603, Appendix to §263;cf. Feldman, 'Philo's Version of
Balaam',311.
19 For introduction, text, translation and commentary see also M. Stern, Greekand
Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism, vol. I, Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences
and Humanities, 1974,93-6: No. 25.
It is tempting to regard the admonition 'not to pass a certain spot,
on which an ass had collapsed' as an allusion to the ass in the Balaam
narrative, which collapsed under Balaam in order to escape the threat-
ening Angel of the Lord, who had positioned himself in its path: 'And
when the ass saw the angel of God, she lay down under Balaam;and
Balaam was angry, and struck the ass with his staff.And God opened
the mouth of the ass (... ). And God opened the eyes of Balaam, and
he saw the angel of the Lord withstanding him in the way, and his
sword drawn in his hand' (Num 22:27-31 LXX). If Hermippus was
indeed drawing on the Balaam narrative, the story must have been
known to a Greek public. There is no reason, however, to suppose
that this public would have ridiculed this passage. The phenomenon of
the speaking ass is not entirely unknown in Graeco-Roman literature,
as Apuleius and Ps-Lucian testify (see Czachesz's contribution to this
volume, §§4-5).
It is more likely that Philo, given his sophistic portrayal of Balaam, is
simply less interested in the episode of the speaking ass. All it receives
is an allegorical interpretation to the effect that it stands for ordinary
pursuits in life, such as farming and trade. Those who 'follow the life
of the merchant or the farmer or other business which men pursue
for gain' sit on their beast, and blame it when disappointment and
misfortune befall them. These ways of life, however, Philo argues, are
wholly guiltless objects, because the angel of the Lord, the reason of
God, who can intervene along the path of all men, is the source of all
good and ill. Only if man uses this divine reason in the right way will
he become a truly happy and reasonable being (De cherubim 32-33).
The speaking ass is only of minor importance to Philo, since his
interest is focused on Balaam, whom he turns in a worse character
than the text of Numbers allows for. Contrary to the biblical account
in Numbers, Philo asserts that
not even when the closed eye of his soul received its sight and 'beheld
the angel of God standing in his way' (Num 22:31) did he turn aside
and refrain from evil-doing, but let the stream of his folly run full course
and was overwhelmed by it and swallowed up. (... ) [H]e who listens not,
who is not turned from his course by the Conviction which stands in his
path, will in time receive destruction 'with the wounded' (Num 31:8)
whom their passions stabbed and wounded with a fatal stroke. (Qyod deus
sit immutabilis 181-183)
This focus on Balaam the Sophist becomes more understandable if one
realizes that Philo's invectiveagainst Balaam is part of his comprehensive
programme of refuting the sophists. In many passages Philo gives
characteristics of these sophists. In his view, the issues of sophistry date
back to the very beginning of creation and have accompanied Israel
ever SInce.
In his work, Philo characterizes the sophists as mere lovers of words:
'while most people deem the man prudent who can find sophistical argu-
ments, and is clever at expressing his ideas (Ot/lEVyap 1tOAAOt(j)POVt/lOV
VO/ltsoucrt 'tOYEUpE'tllVMywv cro(j)tcr'ttlcrovlCat OEtVOVep/lTlVEucrat'to
VOTl8EV),Moses knows such an one to be a lover of words (Mwucrf]<;oE
AOYO(j)tATlV/EVau'tov OtOE)indeed, but a prudent man by no means'
(Legum allegoriae 1.74). Their rhetorical capacities and specious sophistic
arguments ([lCa'ta]Myot cro(j)tcrnlCOt)belong to the sphere of the body
and the sense organs from which the mind must withdraw (Legum alle-
goriae 3.41). We have to abandon excessive, sophistic quibbling about
the meaning of words: 1taucro/lE8a 'tf]<;ayav cro(j)tcr'tEla<;(Legum allegoriae
3.206) and be led away from 'the sophistries of deceitful word and
thought': E~W ... 'trov lCa'ta 'tOYa1ta'tEroVaAOyovcro(j)tcr'tEtrov(Qyis rerum
divinarum heres sit 85). Sometimes the sophists are criticized for their lit-
eralism and their failure to apply the rules of allegory (De somniis 1.102);
on other occasions they, like the poets, are portrayed as obsessed with
myths (De opificio mundi 157;cf. De vita contemplativa 4), the obsession of
'those whose way is to deal in marvels and cultivate sophistry rather
than wisdom' (De praemiis et poenis 8).
Sophistry is to be censured because 'sophists (cro(j)tcr'tat),impelled at
once by mercenary motives and by a grudging spirit, stunt the natures
of their pupils by withholding much that they ought to tell them, care-
fully reserving for themselves against another day the opportunity of
making money' (De posteritate Caini 150). They, 'the multitudes of soph-
ists', wrongly imagine 'that wisdom consists in finding specious argu-
ments, and not in appealing to the solid evidence of facts': lCa8a1tEp
/lUptOt<;crUVE~Tl'trovcro(j)tcr'trov,olnvE<;<i>iJ8Tlcravcro(j)tavm8avllv dVat
Mywv EtlpmtV, aAA' ou 1tpaY/la'twv aATl8m'ta'tTlv 1ttcrnv (De migratione
Abrahami 171-172). Whereas Philo leaves 'the invention of ingenious
arguments and perverse pretexts to the sophists, the task of wisdom is
to investigate all that nature has to show': aAAa yap cro(j)tcr'tEla<;/lEV
EpyOVeupecrlAoye'iv, cro<pia~of:fKacr'ta OlepeUVav 'troy ev 't1l <pucrn
(De providentia, frag. 1.1). The origins of this impious, sophistic way of
thinking Philo attributes to 'an ancient sophist named Protagoras', who
regarded the human mind as the measure of all things: 'ti~o-ovecrnv
acre~ou~06~a;IlE'tpovdvat 1tav'trovXPTllla'trov'tOYav8promvov vouv·n
Kat 'troy 1taAatrov nva crO<plcr'troVovolla npro'tay6pav <pacrtXPTtcracr8at
(De posteritate Caini 35).
Sometimes Philo can even attribute the title of sophists to all phi-
losophers insofar as they do not agree in their solutions to particular
problems,20 although among them he singles out the sophistic posi-
tion proper of 'those who argue at length that man is the measure of
all things' . Yet, since the history of philosophy is full of discordance,
'because truth flees from the credulous mind which deals in conjecture'
and eludes discovery and pursuit, all scientific quarrellings can be char-
acterized as 'wranglings of the sophists on questions of dogma' (OJtis
rerum divinarum heres sit 246). In certain respects, the sophists resemble the
sceptics, who 'spend themselves on petty quibbles and trifling disputes'.
Indeed, 'in philosophy there are men who are merely word-mongers
and word-hunters' (De congressueruditionis gratia 51~53).
Sophists are also encountered among the audiences of philosophers,
who fill the lecture-halls and theatres on a daily basis. Among the
audience, there is also a class of people 'who carry away an echo of
what has been said, but prove to be sophists rather than philosophers
(cro<plcr'tatof:av'tt <plAocr6<prova eupicrKoV'tat). These people's words
deserve praise, but their lives censure, for they are capable of saying
the best, but incapable of doing it' (De congressu eruditionis gratia 67).
Sophists profess an extremely sceptical philosophy and love arguing for
argument's sake, thus opposing all other representatives of the sciences
(DejUga et inventione 209). They are not interested in what is authentic,
but rather mimic and debase it by juxtaposing it with spurious matters
(De mutatione nominum 208), just as Balaam wished to deface the stamp
of genuine, heaven-sent prophecy with his oracular sophistry (De muta-
tione nominum 203). At the end of the day, Philo regards the sophists as
poorly as he does the uneducated. In this, they contrast sharply with
'the saintly company of the Pythagoreans' and 'all genuine votaries of
philosophy', who,
rising above the opinions of the common herd (... ) have opened up a
new pathway, which the outside world can never tread, for studying and
discerning truths, and have brought to light the ideal forms which none
of the unclean may touch.
Both, the uneducated and the sophists, are regarded as 'unclean':
By unclean I mean all those who, without ever tasting education at all, or
else having received it in a crooked and distorted form, have changed the
stamp of wisdom's beauty into the ugliness of sophistry (l(aAAO~'to cro<pia~
d~'to cro<ptcrn:ia~atcrxo~lLe'taxapa~av'te~). These, unable to discern the
conceptual light through the weakness of the soul's eye, which cannot but
be beclouded by the flashing rays, as dwellers in perpetual night, disbelieve
those who live in the daylight, and think that all their tales of what they
have seen around them, shown clearly by the unalloyed radiance of the
sunbeams, are wild phantom-like inventions no better than the illusions
of the puppet show (Qyod omnis probus liber sit 1-5).
In this passage, the sophists are clearly identified with the dwellers in
Plato's cave (Republic VII, 514ff.), Socrates' sophistic opponents and all
other uneducated. The inability of the cave-dwellers 'to discern the
conceptual light through the weakness of the soul's eye' is also exhibited
by Balaam, as we have already seen: 'not even when the closed eye
of his soul received its sight and "beheld the angel of God standing in
his way" (Num 22:31) did he turn aside and refrain from evil-doing,
but let the stream of his folly run full course' (Qyod deus sit immutabilis
181).21 Balaam is indeed a sophist par excellence.
Balaam is not the only sophist which Israel encountered, however.
According to Philo, the entire history from creation to the voyage of
Israel through the wilderness was full of sophistic attacks on the 'true
philosophy'. The main episodes of this unceasing tension are (1) the
2' Yet, with regard to the contents of his oracles, Balaam is described more favorably
by Philo. In his introduction to Balaam's third and (in Philo's representation) final
oracle, Balaam is described as 'the one who saw in sleep a clear presentation of God
with the unsleepingryes ifthe sour (De vita Mosis 1.289;italics mine). On this, see C.T.R.
Hayward, 'Balaam's Prophecies as Interpreted by Philo and the Aramaic Targums of
the Pentateuch', in: PJ.Harland & C.T.R. Hayward (eds),New Heaven and New Earth:
Prophecy and the Millennium. Essays in Honour ifAnthony Gelston (Supplements to Vetus
Testamentum 77), Leiden: Brill, 1999, 19-36 at 20-24, esp. 22. In this way, accord-
ing to Hayward, 'Something extraordinary has happened. By so speaking of Balaam,
Philo has invested him with the character of Israel, (... ) "the one who sees God'"
(Hayward, 22-24 at 22;cf. 35).
creation and the life of the first human beings, Adam and Eve, Cain
and Abel, (2) the period of the patriarchs and the matriarchs, (3) the
period of Israel in Egypt from Joseph to Moses, both of whom were
confronted with 'the sophists of Egypt', and (4) the period ofIsrael in
the wilderness, where Moses and the Israelites encountered the Amorites
and Balaam. Together, these episodes cover the entire narrative span
of Moses' Pentateuch, from the creation to the exodus and the voyage
through the wilderness.
(a) Creation's anti-sophistic order
With an eye to the future attacks by sophists, God already built into
the very set-up of the original creation a reminder that it is not wise
to trust created phenomena rather than God. This is how Philo tries
to explain why God created the earth on the third day, whereas the
sun and moon were only created on the fourth day, despite the fact
that the plants and fruits on the earth were dependent upon them for
their growth:
being aware beforehand of the ways of thinking that would mark the
men of future ages, how they would be intent on what looked probable
and plausible, with much in it that could be supported by argument,
but would not aim at sheer truth;and how they would trust phenomena
rather than God, admiring sophistry more than wisdom (on 1ttcrteucroU<H
llaA.A.OVtOt~CPatVOllEV(n~11 ee0 crocptcrteiav1tpOcrocpia~eaullacraVte~);
and how they would observe in times to come the circuits of sun and
moon (... ) and would suppose that the regular movements of the heav-
enly bodies are the causes of all things that year by year come forth and
are produced out of the earth;that there might be none who (... ) would
venture to ascribe the first place to any created thing, 'let them', said
He, 'go back in thought to the original creation of the universe, when,
before sun or moon existed, the earth bore plants of all sorts and fruits
of all sorts' (De opificio mundi 45-46).
The unexpected order of creation serves, Philo agues, to show the
unfoundedness of sophistry which bases itself only on superficial phe-
nomena. The force of sophistry already revealed itself in the lives of
the first men, particularly in those of Eve, Cain and Abel.
(b) The Serpent versus Eve
Philo ascribes the first sin to the influence of sophistry, to the serpent,
'emitting a human voice and arguing like a sophist (Evcro<jncru:urov)to
an utterly guileless character, and cheating a woman with seductive
plausibilities' (De agricultura 96).
(c) Cain versus Abel
Moreover, the first murder, of Abel by Cain, was due to Cain's sophis-
tic inclinations, against which Abel, untrained in the arts of rhetoric,
could not protect himself. It is noteworthy that in his interpretation of
this episode, Philo is not only critical of Cain, but also of Abel for his
excessive naivety in meeting up with Cain. The sophists, like Cain,
when they have covered the dreary length of a long-distance course of
talk (... ) are held to have defeated men unaccustomed to arguing like
sophists (OOqJtOtfU£lV). But their victory lies not in the strength of those
who have won, but in their opponents' weakness in this sort of thing. For
those who apply themselves to the pursuit of virtue may be placed in two
classes. (I) Some, making the soul alone the treasure-house of the good at
which they aim, devote themselves to praiseworthy actions, without hav-
ing so much as dreamt ofjuggling with words. (2)The others are doubly
successful;their mind is secured by wisdom in counsel and good deeds,
their speech by the arts of eloquence. Now to encounter the wranglings
in which some folk [i.e. the sophists]delight is eminently fitting for these
latter, ready and equipped as they are with the means of withstanding
their enemies, but for the former class it is not at all safe to do so. (... )
Now Abel had never learned arts of speech, and knew the beautiful and
noble with the mind only. For this reason he should have declined the
meeting on the plain, and have paid no regard to the challenge of the
man of ill-will (Qjlod deteriuspotion insidian soleat 35-37).
The hidden message of this passage is, no doubt, that one should be
trained in eloquence and speech so as to be able to counter-attack the
sophists, lest one sufferthe fate of Abel. As we shall see in §3, it is exactly
this message that Philo wants to communicate to his own readers.
The need to train both mind and speech is emphasized by numerous
other examples from Israel's history. Cain is in fact the instructor of
all sophists, and the sophist Protagoras is in fact 'an offSpringof Cain's
madness'. Cain 'proved the strength of his creed by unmistakable deeds
in his victory over Abel, the champion of the opposite opinion, and
in getting rid of both him and his opinion' (De posteritate Caini 35)-so
serious is the struggle between sophists and non-sophists. Cain's strat-
egy, according to Philo, consists in building demonstrative arguments,
delivering lengthy expositions and perorations, and 'forging plausible
inventions contrary to the truth': sophistic devices (<xi (Joqn(J'ttKat'tEXVat)
which are used by 'the wise in their own conceit, devotees of impiety,
godlessness, self-love, arrogance, false opinion, men ignorant of real
wisdom' (De posteritate Caini 53).
The other instances in which the strife between sophists and
non-sophists comes to the fore cover most key narratives in Moses'
Pentateuch, among them the narratives about the patriarchs and
matriarchs.
(d) Abraham versus the Chaldeans
Abraham, forsaking Chaldean astrology when called by God, 'changes
by instruction from sophist to sage': !Xv'tt croqncr'tou YEv6~EVO~EK
oloacrKaAia~ crocp6~(De praemiis et poenis 58).
(e) Hagar and Ishmael versus Sarah and Isaac
The sophistic struggle reiterates itself among his children, Ishmael
and Isaac. Whereas Sarah, Isaac's mother, represents virtue, Ishmael's
mother, Hagar, symbolizes only preliminary studies.22 Her child can
but be a sophist who has to be banished:
the most perfect types of being and the secondary acquirements are
worlds apart, and wisdom has no kinship with the sophist's culture (<Joq>ia
<Joq>t<JtEta<;aAAOtptOV).For the latter has for the fruits of all its labour
only those persuasions which tend to establish the false opinion, which
destroys the soul;but wisdom studies truth and thus obtains that great
source of profit to the mind, knowledge of right reason. (... ) the sophist,
who is ever sophist, and his mother, instruction in preliminary learning,
are expelled and banished by God from the presence of wisdom and the
wise, on whom he confers the titles of Sarah and Abraham: (mOtEKat
<Kata> ltuvta <JOq>l<JtllVKat IlTJtEpa a{nou, tllV tIDVltPOltUlOEUIlUtffiV
OlOa<JKaAiav,fAaUVElKat q>uyaOEUElaltO <Joq>ia<;Kat <Joq>ou,d)v QVOllata'
A~paull tE Kat Luppav KaAEl (De cherubim 9-10).
Hagar's child represents 'the souljust beginning to crave after instruc-
tion', because Hagar herself only offersincomplete education so that her
child, 'when grown to manhood, becomes a sophist' (De posteritate Caini
131).As a sophist he has only covered 'the school subjects', and not the
'sciences which deal with virtues' (De sobrietate 9-10). Interpreting the
22 See A.P. Bos, 'Hagar and the Enkyklios Paideia in Philo of Alexandria' in the
proceedings of the 2006 TBN Conference on Hagar (forthcoming in the TBN series,
Leiden: Brill).
assertion, made by the angel of the Lord, that Ishmael 'will be a wild
man; his hand will be against all' (Cen 16: 12), Philo argues:
Now this picture clearly represents the sophist (... ). (He is) like those who
are now called Academics and Sceptics, who place no foundation under
their opinions and doctrines and do not (prefer) one thing to another,
for they admit those as philosophers who shoot at (the doctrines) of every
school, and these it is customary to call 'opinion-fighters' (Qjlaestiones in
Genesin III.33).
(f) Rebecca's non-sophistic attitude
It is Isaac's wife Rebecca who again symbolizes the correct non-sophistic
attitude. Commenting on Rebecca's generosity in giving a servant
abundant water to drink, Philo remarks:
When she saw how readily receptive of virtue the servant's nature was,
she emptied all the contents of her pitcher into the drinking-trough,
that is to say, she poured all the teacher's knowledge into the soul of the
learner. For, whereas sophists (O"ocptO"'tai),mpelled at once by mercenary
motives and by a grudging spirit, stunt the natures of their pupils by
withholding much that they ought to tell them, carefully reserving for
themselves against another day the opportunity of making money, virtue
is an ungrudging thing, fond of making gifts, never hesitating to do good
(De posteritate Caini 150-151).
After the narratives of the patriarchs and matriarchs, Philo also weaves
the struggle with the sophists into Israel's sojourn in Egypt. BothJoseph
and Moses are confronted with 'the sophists of Egypt'. This, of course,
is very relevant to Philo and his public. Being resident in Alexandria
in Egypt himself, in a subtle way he equates the contemporary soph-
ists of Alexandria with their Egyptian predecessors from the times of
Joseph and Moses.
(g) Joseph versus the sophists of Egypt
In Philo's representation, the history ofIsrael and the sophists continues
with Joseph. Philo is not entirely positive about Joseph, whose 'coat of
varied colours' (Cen 37:3) is interpreted by Philo as:
the woven robe of statecraft (1toA.t'tEia),a robe richly variegated, contain-
ing but a most meagre admixture of truth, but many large portions of
false, probable, plausible, conjectural matter, from which sprang up all
the sophists of Egypt (oi Aiyu1t'tou 1tUnEs O"ocptO"1:ai)(De somniis 1.220).
This passage also reveals that Philo is very much aware of the power
which rhetorically trained sophists exert in the political arena, a power
he may have experienced in the tensions in Alexandria between the
Jews and the Greeks, which resulted in each side sending a delegation
to the emperor Gaius.23 Winter, who also draws a parallel between
Philo and Plato in this respect, notes:
The role of the sophists in the political life of the city also drew criticism
from Philo, for the deception of the sophistic tradition inevitably spilt over
into that arena. 'All the sophists of Egypt' were said to have sprung up
in the area of politeia from 'a meagre mixture' of truth and 'many large
portions of false, probable, plausible, conjectural matter'. They became
experts 'in decoying, charming, and bewitching' their hearers, Somn.1.220.
Plato's view was that among the sophists, those who attempted to direct
the polis through deliberative oratory were the greatest sorcerers and most
practiced in charlatanism. (The Statesman 291C, 303C)24
Despite his critical note about Joseph's sophistic garment, Philo por-
trays Joseph as the one who succeeds over the Egyptians sophists in
interpreting the dreams of the Egyptian king. As the king anticipates:
'He will reveal the truth, and as light disperses darkness his knowledge
will disperse the ignorance of our sophists': OtaKaA{nj!"El'tllVUAf)8EtaV,
ola <pont O'K6'tO~E1ttO''tf)IlTI'tllv uIla8iav 'tIDV1tap' iWtv O'O<ptO''tIDV
U1toO'KEoaO'Et(De Josepho 104). Joseph distinguishes himself favourably
from the 'sophistic praters who shew off their cleverness for hire and
use their art of interpreting the visions given in sleep as a pretext of
making money' (De Josepho 125).
(h) Moses versus the sophists of Egypt
These Egyptian sophists are the same group whom Moses confronts
at the court of the Egyptian king (De vita Mosis 1.92). It is of course no
coincidence that the Egyptian magicians are called 'sophists' by Philo.
In this way, Philo places his own struggle with sophistic circles in Alex-
andria in the wider perspective of the age-long controversy between
Israel and the sophists, both within Egypt and beyond. Moses is only
23 Cf. Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, 96: 'The Greeks were well repre-
sented by these men [Isidorus, Apion and Lampon]who, needless to say, possessed
the rhetorical training needed to present their case'. Cf. Winter, 96-8 about Philo's
rhetorical ability as can be discerned from the captatio benevolentiae still extant in his De
legatione ad Gaium.
24 Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, 90.
able to confront the sophists because he has first been thoroughly trained
after admitting his inexperience in speech. Unlike Abel, Moses is not
naive about the tricks of the sophists and avails himself of the help of
Aaron, who acts as his spokesman:
Do you not see that Moses declines the invitation of the sophists (O"ocptO"'tUt)
in Egypt (... )?He calls them magicians, because good morals are spoiled
by the tricks and deceptions of sophistry (O"ocptO"llu'twv... 't£XVUli;KUt
a1tu'tut~)which act on them like the enchantments of magic. Moses' plea
is that he is not 'eloquent' (Exod 4: 10),which is equivalent to saying that
he has no gift for oratory, which is but specious guesswork about what
seems probable. Afterwards he follows this up by emphatically stating
that he is not merely not eloquent but absolutely 'speechless' (Exod 6: 12).
He calls himself 'speechless', not in the sense in which we use the word
of animals without reason, but of him who fails to find a fitting instru-
ment in the language uttered by the organs of speech, and prints and
impresses on his understanding the lessons of true wisdom, the direct
opposite of false sophistry (av'tte£'t6~... '1'£1)0£1O"ocptO"'tEi~).And he will
not go to Egypt nor engage in conflict with its sophists (O"ocptO"'tUt),until
he has been fully trained in the word of utterance, God having shown
and perfected all the qualities which are essential to the expression of
thought by the election of Aaron who is Moses' brother (Qyod delerius
potiori insidiari sokal 38-39).
Thus trained, Moses is able to meet the Egyptian king at the edge or
mouth of the river (Exod 7: 15), Philo says. This place of encounter is
taken, in an allegorical sense, to point to the lips through which the
stream of speech passes:
Now speech is an ally employed by those who hate virtue [i.e. by the
sophists] ( ), and also by men of worth for the destruction of such
doctrines ( ). When, indeed, after they have shaken out every reef
of fallacious opinions, the opposing onset of the sage's speech [i.e. the
speech of Moses]has overturned their bark and sent them to perdition,
he [Moses]will (... ) set in order his holy choir to sing the anthem of
victory (De corifitsionelinguarum 33-35).
This triumph of Moses over the sophists at the 'lip of the river', reminds
Philo of the even greater triumph of Israel over the Egyptians who
attempted to pursue them through the Red Sea, but drowned and were
seen dead at the edge of the sea (Exod 14:30). Their death symbol-
izes 'the destruction of unholy doctrines and of the words which their
mouth and tongue and the other vocal organs gave them to use' (De
conjUsione 35). As Philo puts is elsewhere: 'the scene of their death is
none other than the lips of that fountain bitter and briny as the sea,
those very lips through which poured forth the sophist-talk which wars
against virtue (Ot' d)v /) 1tOAEJ.UOC;apE'tTlC;O"oqnO"'tllC;MyoC;£~EICEXU'tO)'
(De somniis 2.281-282).
As we have seen before, Philo warns his readers that there are many
who 'have not the capacity to demolish by sheer force the plausible
inventions of the sophists ('tUC;m8avuc;'trov O"o<j>tO"'trov),because their
occupation has lain continuously in active life, so they are not trained
in any high degree to deal with words' (De conjUsione 39). Such rhetori-
cal training is crucial if one is to succeed in defeating the sophists, as
Moses' life shows.
This counter-attack against the sophists naturally also colours the
Mosaic laws. According to Philo, Moses' anti-sophistic intentions can
be noted in his decrees concerning the holy seventh day on which one
should abstain 'from work and profit-making crafts and professions and
business pursued to get a livelihood'. The leisure of this day
should be occupied (... ) by the pursuits of wisdom only. And the wisdom
must not be that of the systems hatched by the word-catchers and soph-
ists (oi A.oyoOT\pat Kat cro<pt<J'tat) who sell their tenets and arguments like
any bit of merchandise in the market, men who for ever pit philosophy
against philosophy (Ot<ptA.ocr<pt~Ka'tu <ptA.ocro<ptW;... XPcO~EVot)without a
blush (... ), but the true philosophy which is woven from three strands~
thoughts, words and deeds (De vita Mosis 2.211-212).25
(4)Israel in the wilderness:Moses and the Israelites versus the Amorites and
Balaam
(i) Israel versus the Amorites
The attacks suffered from the sophists do not stop once Israel leaves
Egypt. Even during the voyage through the wilderness, the sophists
continue to plague them. Philo mentions them by name: the Amorites
and Balaam.
The name 'Amorites', Philo argues, should be etymologically under-
stood as 'men fond of talking', who 'symbolize the uttered word' ('tou
25 A further instance of Moses' anti-sophistic codifications is found in De specialibus
legibus 3.54 where accusers who appear before the judges are warned that they should
draw up their formal challenges 'not in the spirit of a false accuser or malicious schemer,
set on winning at any cost, but of one who would strictly test the truth without sophistry
(avEu O'O<jllO''tEta.<;)'.Although closely following Num 5: 12~31 the phrase aVEuO'O<jllO''teta.<;
is lacking from the Septuagint.
YEyrov6'toC;Myou O"Uf.lPoAovOV'tEC;).Philo draws here on the Stoic distinc-
tion between logos prophorikos ('speech') and logos endiathetos ('thought').26
The Amorites represent only the former, the uttered word, without
it being the vehicle of the internal word. The problem here, in the
Amorites' case, is that their uttered word does not function in harmoni-
ous cooperation with the internal word (a harmony which, as we shall
see, is advocated by Philo), but is in fact devoid of internal reason. As
Adam Kamesar has convincingly shown, in Philo's view the training
of the logos prophorikos should be assigned to the discipline of rhetoric,
and that of the logos endiathetos to philosophy. This view is also upheld
in Greek writers such as Plutarch, Hermias of Alexandria and Sopater.
The setting of this assignment of the two logoi to these two disciplines,
Kamesar shows, is that of the conflict between rhetoric and philosophy.
These two logoi are meant to function harmoniously: 'A paideia that is
concerned with both 'to CPPOVEtVand 'to !Oil AEyEtV,the educational ideal
that goes back to Isocrates, would entail the cooperative synergy of the
logos endiathetos and the logosprophorikos, if Stoic terminology is employed' Y
By portraying the Amorites as only in command of the logos prophorikos
without the backing of the logos endiathetos, Philo characterizes them as
sophists. Their king, according to Philo,
is the sophist clever at searching after verbal artifices (6 oo<pto't"~ EO'tt !CUt
OEtVO~'Aoywv UVEpEUViiv'texvu~); and those who transgress the boundary
of truth place themselves at the mercy of his quibbling (Legum allegoriae
3.232).
He is concerned with sophistic riddles ('tu uiviyf.lu'tu 'tu O"ocptO"nKu),
probabilities and plausible arguments which involve no knowledge of
the truth (233).
26 See G. Verbeke, 'Logos I. Der Logosbegriffin der antiken Philosophy', Historisches
Worterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 5 (1980), 495-6n4 with reference to Sextus Empiricus,
Adversus Mathematicos 8.275 (= Adversus Dogmaticos 2.275): 'Man does not differ in respect
of uttered reason from the irrational animals (... ), but in respect of internal reason'
(trans. KG. Bury, Loeb Classical Library);= Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 2.135.
27 A. Kamesar, 'The Logos Endiathetos and the Logos Prophorikos in Allegorical
Interpretation: Philo and the D-Scholia to the Iliad', Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies
44 (2004) 163~81, esp. 170-3 at 173, with an extensive bibliography on the logos
endiathetos and the logos prophorikos in I63-4n I.
(j) Balaam
The threat which the Amorites pose to Israel in the wilderness is
another instance of sophists' onslaught against knowledge and truth.
Philo found this episode narrated in Numbers 21, just before Balaam
takes centre-stage in Numbers 22-24. In this sense, the appearance
of Balaam the sophist, already discussed in §1 above, constitutes the
climax of Israel's manifold encounters with the sophists.
An intriguing question which arises when one takes in the multitude of
Philo's comments on sophists is why he devoted so much attention to
them. There are clear indications in his writings that Philo views the
sophists of his day as a clear threat which he wishes to tackle head-on.
I take my starting-point in another passage on the Amorites, whose
name, as we have just seen, Philo explains as 'men fond of talking', and
whose king he referred to as a sophist. In OJtis rerum divinarum heres sit,
Philo, having introduced the Amorites and identified them as 'talkers',
remarks that the gift of speech 'has been marred by thousands of the
recipients (... ). These are impostors, flatterers, and inventors of cun-
ning plausibilities'. Their practice is contrasted with 'the man of worth'
whose speech 'should be transparent and true. But the speech which
most strive for is obscure and false' (302-303). Philo clearly experiences
this as a problem of his own day:
So long then as 'the sins of the Amorites', that is of sophistical arguments,
'are not fulfilled' (Gen. 15: 16) because of the fact that they are difficult
to disprove and criticize (o~v OUKaVa1tE1tA.T\pOrtatta ullaptJ1llata trov
A.lloppatrov, tOUtE<Jtt trov <JoCjn<JttKrovA.oyrovOtU to aVE~EA.EYKtOV),but
still in virtue of their powers of attraction seduce us (lilla~ £1taYEtat)
with their plausibilities, while their enticements make us powerless to turn
from and leave them, we remain powerless. But if ever all the plausible
fallacies are refuted by true beliefs (... ), we shall (... ) slip our cable and
sail clean away from the land of falsehood and sophistry (apallEVot tT\~
trov 'l'Eu<JllatrovKat <JoCj>t<Jllatrovxwpa~) (... ) Such is the lesson expressed
in the problem here presented. For it is impossible to turn back from,
to hate, to leave the plausible falsehood, unless the sin involved in it be
revealed complete and consummated. And this revelation will be made
when, confronted by the firm evidence of truth, it receives the much-
needed refutation (KatU tiJv tOUUA.T]eOU~avtita~tv Kat I3El3atro<Jtv)(Qyis
rerum divinarum heres sit 304-306).
In this passage, Philo shows his concern that the sophistic powers of
attraction may 'seduce us' (lJllU<;E1tay£'tat), that is him and his con-
temporary readers. It demonstrates that even in a passage about the
Amorites of long ago, who tried to seduce Israel in the wilderness,
Philo recognizes the sophists of his own day. He also acknowledges
that the sophistic arguments are difficult to disprove and criticize, yet
emphasizes that their refutation is much-needed. We encounter here a
vivid interest is the philosophical discussion of his own day.
That Philo regards the sophists as a present-day phenomenon and not
only as a literary motif derived from Plato's anti-sophistic dialogues is
shown by the fact that he talks explicidy about 'the orators or sophists
iftoday':01 PlJ'top£<;11 01 vvvO"ocptO"'tat(De vita contemplativa 31). They are
contrasted with the senior leader of the Jewish sect of the Therapeutae
who, every seventh day,
gives a well-reasoned and wise discourse. He does not make an exhibition
of clever rhetoric like the orators or sophists of today but follows careful
examination by careful expression of the exact meaning of his thoughts,
and this does not lodge just outside the ears of the audience but passes
through the hearing into the soul and there stays securely.
Elsewhere, too, Philo explicidy makes the link with contemporary soph-
ists, the sophistic throng of people of the present day: 6 vuv av8pro1tO>v
O"OcptO"'ttKO<;lltAO<;.The road which leads to God, Philo argues, one
must take
to be philosophy, not the philosophy which is pursued by the sophistic
throng of people of the present day (0vuv av8pwmov O"O<jltO"tt1(O~Ol!tAO~),
who, having practised arts of speech to use against the truth, have given
the name of wisdom to their rascality, conferring on a sorry work a divine
title (De posteritate Caini 10 I).
A further indication that Philo, in his discussion of the sophists is think-
ing primarily of the sophists of his own day, is the lively portrait of
everyday life of which the throng of sophists is part:
Day after day the throng of sophists, which is to be found everywhere
(0 1tavtaxOu tOWO"O<jltO"twvOl!tAO~),talks the ears off any audience they
happen to have with disquisitions on minutiae, unravelling phrases that
are ambiguous and can bear two meanings and distinguishing among
circumstances such as it is well to bear in mind-and they are set on
bearing in mind a vast number (De agricultura 136).
They are the ones who, though professing to be philosophers, fill the
lecture-halls and theatres almost every day, 'discoursing at length,
stringing together their disquisitions on virtue without stopping to draw
breath. Yet what profit is there in their talk?' (De congressu64).28
In a passage in which Philo criticizes the hectic and indulgent, pas-
sionate lifestyle of the sophists, the sheer size of the sophist movement
is also highlighted:
And so multitudes of those who are called sophists (IlUptOt ... trov
A.eyollEvcov<Jo<pt<J'trov),after winning the admiration of city after city
(eUUIlU<JeEVtE~KUtU 1tOA.W;),and after drawing well-nigh the whole
world to honour them (KUt tl]V OtKOUIlEVT\V<JX£{)OVa1tu<Juv E1tt 'tt1ll]V
E1tt<JtPE"'UVtE~)for their hair-splitting and their clever inventiveness, have
with all their might worn their life out, and brought it to premature old
age, by the indulgence of their passions (De agricultura 143).
This movement spreads through the cities like wildfire and, Philo fears,
is influencing the young: 'Vanity (... ) with its sophisms (cr6qncr/-lu'tu) and
trickery beguiles every city and loses no time in capturing the souls of
the young' (De praemiis 25).
It is in this world that Philo wants to shoulder his philosophical
responsibilities and there are several passages in his writings which
express his personal commitment to refuting sophistry. Philo does not
regard himself as Abel, who had never learned the arts of speech and
for whom it was not safe to encounter the wranglings of the sophists
(Oyod deterius potiori insidiari soleat 35), but likeI1s himself to Moses, who
only engaged in conflict with the sophists once he had been fully trained
in rhetoric (Oyod deterius 38-39). As he makes plain:
It will be well for us to counter in this manner those who are pugnacious
over the tenets which they maintain; for when we have been exercised
in the forms which words take, we shall no more sink to the ground
through inexperience of the tricks of the sophistic wrestling (OUKEt'a1tEtpt~
<JO<pt<J'ttKroV1tUA.UlOIlUtCOVKA.U<J0IlEV),but we shall spring up and carry
on the struggle and disentangle ourselves with ease from the grips which
their art has taught them. (... ) But if a man, though equipped in soul with
all the virtues, has had no practice in rhetoric, (... ) when like Abel he
28 I agree with Winter that this passage is about sophists. See Winter, Philo and Paul
Among the Sophists, 74: 'Philo comments that hardly a day goes by but lecture-halls and
theatres fill with Ot q:nA.o<JOlpOUVtEC;.Various classes of people listen with different but
inadequate responses. But to whom does Philo refer?While Ot qnA.o<JOlpOuvtEc;can
be translated as "philosophers", it often means sophists in the Philo corpus. In Post.
34 Philo mentions that many who have "professed" philosophy arrive at conclusions
belonging to the ancient sophist, Protagoras.'
steps out for a sophistic contest (EL;<JOcpt<J'ttKOVa:ywva), he will fall before
he has obtained a firm footing (Qyod deterius 41-42).
Philo clearly regards himself as fully up to the job. This is no task for
those who are just beginning their studies, those making progress, and
those who have reached perfection without having established firm roots.
All these should refuse 'to engage in the war waged by the sophists' (Kat
Jll]'tip 'trov cro<pt<nrov E1ta1toou£cr8at 1tOA.£Jl<:fl);if they, mere amateurs,
engage 'trained and seasoned fighters, they will undoubtedly get the
worst of it' (De agricultura 159;162). Therefore,
It will, then, be the business of him who fully apprehends and understands
the subject, and thoroughly knows his own powers, to go to war with
the strife-loving band of sophists (7tOAEllll<Jat' ip CPtAEpt~hKat <JOcpt<J'ttKip
<J'ttcpEt)(De agricultura 162).
Philo's strong advice not to engage lightly in the strife with sophists
probably reflects his experience of the ongoing clash between sophistry
and philosophy in his own days. His own ideal is to integrate rhetoric,
intentions and virtuous deeds in one coherent whole. In support of this
ideal he quotes Moses:
In a thoroughly philosophical way he [Moses]makes a threefold division
of it, saying: 'It is in thy mouth and in thy heart and in thine hand' (Deut
30: 11-14), that is, in words, in plans, in actions. For these are the parts
of the good thing, and of these it is compacted, and the lack of but one
not only renders it imperfect but absolutely destroys it. For what good
is it to say the best things but to plan and carry out the most shameful
things? This is the way of the sophists (<Jocpt<J'twvo{)'to~0 'tp67to~),for as
they spin out their discourses on sound sense and endurance they grate
on the ears of those most thirsting to listen, but in the choices that they
make and the actions of their lives we find them going very far wrong.
It is equally wrong, however, to have good intentions but fail in deeds
and words, or to practice the right things 'without understanding and
explicit speech'.
But if a man succeeded, as if handling a lyre, in bringing all the notes
of the thing that is good into tune, bringing speech into harmony with
intent, and intent with deed, such an one would be considered perfect
and of a truly harmonious character (De posteritate Caini 85-88).29
29 This threefold enterprise is also discussed in De aglicultura 144;De congressueruditionis
gratia 67-68;and De vita Mosis 2.212.
In order to achieve this synthesis, and avoid one-sidedness of whatever
kind, Philo also reflects on the Stoic distinction between logos prophorikos
('speech') and logos endiathetos ('thought'), as we saw in the case of the
sophistic Amorites who only possessed the former logos (see at the end
of §2). Philo stresses that one should master both logoi:
'Logos' has two aspects, one resembling a spring, the other its outflow;
'logos' in the understanding resembles a spring, and is called 'reason',
while utterance by mouth and tongue is like its outflow, and is called
'speech'. That each species of logos should be improved is vast wealth,
understanding having good reasoning at its command for all things great
and small, and utterance being under the guidance of correct training.
For many reason excellently, but find speech a bad interpreter of thought
and are by it betrayed through not having had a thorough grounding in
the ordinary subjects of culture. Others, again, have shown great ability
in expounding themes, and yet been most evil thinkers, such as the so-
called sophists (oi A.fy6/lfVOl CfO<ptCftUl).
Abel is adduced as an example of the first category, those who 'reason
excellently' but lack 'a thorough grounding in the ordinary subjects
of culture', and is contrasted with the sophists. Moses, however, once
he has been trained in knowledge and wisdom, is a perfect example
of those who command both logoi.This is in accordance with God's
intentions:
God bestows on those who obey Him no imperfect boon. All His gifts are
full and complete. And so, in this case also, He does not send the blessing
or 'logos-excellence' in one division oflogos, but in both its parts, for He
holds it just that the recipient of His bounty should both conceive the
noblest conceptions and give masterly expression to his ideas. For perfec-
tion depends, as we know, on both divisions of logos, the reason which
suggests the ideas with clearness, and the speech which gives unfailing
expression to them.
Moses was led to look into knowledge and wisdom 'with a view to
getting the better of the sophists in Egypt (Ot EV Aiy{)7t'tCflcroqn<f'mt)'.
It was Aaron who acted as Moses' logos in utterance (6 1tpo<popn::o~
'A6YOc,,).30 To be versed in both logoi is extremely important:
It is a vital matter, then, for one about to face a contest with sophists
(1tpO~fJ.ywva. CfO<ptCftU::OV)to have paid attention to words with such thor-
oughness as not only to elude the grips of his adversary but to take the
offensive in his turn and prove himself superior both in skill and strength
(De migratione Abrahami 71-82).
In De ebrietate, Philo emphasizes what happens if one is dominated by
the uttered word only. The uttered word (0 KatU 1tpo<popuv ... MyocJ
implants in us
through the specious, the probable and the persuasive (... ) false opinions
for the destruction of our noblest possession, truth. Why, then, should we
not at once take vengeance on him too, sophist (cro<ptcrtTt<;)and miscreant
that he is, by sentencing him to the death that befits him-that is to silence,
for silence is the death of speech?Thus will he no longer ply his sophistries
within the mind ('{va JlllK€t' Evcro<ptcrteuovto<;0 vou<;Jle8€AlClltat),nor will
that mind be led astray, but having been absolutely released from (... )
the sophistries of speech (tOWKata tov ... A6yov cro<ptcrtetmvEAeu8epo<;)
(... ), the mind will be able to devote his unhampered liberty to the world
of mental things (De ebrietate 70-71).
Only if one is versed in both logoi, as Philo makes clear in De migratione,
can one defeat those who 'bring their sophistic trickery into play against
the divine logos (avncrOqncrtEUOVtE<;t(9 8dq> Myq>)'. Philo is optimistic,
however, that this contest with the sophists will be successful: 'All the
arguments of sophists (1tUVtE<;oi cro<ptcrttlCOlA6yot) are devoured and
done away with by Nature's many-sided skill (... ). sophistry is ever
defeated by wisdom (ad cro<ptcrttlav U1tOcro<pia<;TJttucr8at)' (De migra-
tione Abrahami 72-85).
It is to underpin this view, that sophistry has indeed always been
defeated by wisdom, that Philo retells the story of the sophist Balaam
who planned in vain to attack Israel with his sophistic oracles.
Philo not only takes action against contemporary sophistry in general
but seems particularly concerned that the Jewish youth, receiving a
Greek education at Alexandria, may be prone to non-philosophical,
sophistic influences. Speaking about the Jewish race, 'our race', Philo
observes that many have used their education not for the better ('for
day and light') but for the worse ('for night and darkness'), and have
effectively extinguished the enlightenment of their souls by striving after
a life of luxury and high offices:
Many (... ) have acquired the lights in the soul for night and darkness,
not for day and light;all elementary lessons for example, and what is
called school-learning and philosophy itselfwhen pursued with no motive
higher than a life of luxury, or from desire of an officeunder our rulers
(Legum allegoriae 3.166-167).
This concern is recognized already very clearly by Alan Mendelson in
his study 'Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria' (1982):
Neither political activities nor practical applications of the arts and sci-
ences were condemned as inherently evil, although both were fraught with
danger. But Philo drew the line when secular education compromised the
integrity of the individual or the solidarity of the Jewish community. It is
not coincidental that in LA [Legum allegoriae] iii.167-68 the most explicit
instances of miseducation are students who use the encyclia to serve
pretentious ends or to curry favor with the Roman rulers.3l
This observation is further spelled out in Mendelson's final conclusion, in
which he underscores 'the social and political lures of total assimilation'
and 'the real dangers' exerted by the sophistic movement (although,
writing prior to Winter, he does not sufficiently address the issue of the
sophists in the Philonic reflection on secular education):
Taking it for granted that the elite Jewish youth of Alexandria would be
enrolled in Greek institutions, he [Philo]appears to have asked himself
in what way their secular education could be turned to account. Jews,
he insisted, should utilize the encyclia in their strivings toward divine
knowledge instead of exploiting the acquisition of Greek culture simply
to further their social and political ambitions. (... ) In this environment,
the social and political lures of total assimilation must have loomed
large. Philo was particularly sensitive to this issue, perhaps because his
nephew, TiberiusJulius Alexander, had already shown signs of disloyalty
to Judaism. (... ) Philo continued to draw clear lines between what was
acceptable and what was not acceptable for his coreligionists. (... ) Philo
encourages a certain devotion to the encyclia, but he places them within
a Jewish framework, and he repeatedly warns against their seductive
charms. On the latter point, I cannot emphasize too strongly the real
dangers which Philo saw in the disciplines, dangers which ranged from
sophistry to heresy.32
If Philo is indeed gravely concerned about the dangers the sophistic
movement poses to the Greek-educatedJewish youth at Alexandria, I
believe this apprehensiveness accounts for the anti-sophistic slant of his
31 A. Mendelson, Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria (Monographs of the Hebrew
Union College 7), Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1982,46. Cf. also Winter,
Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, 93 with 93n72.
32 Mendelson, Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria, 82.
commentaries on Moses' Pentateuch. Philo's anti-sophistic stance and
his concern about the possible misuse of secular education puzzled F.H.
Colson in an important article 'Philo on Education' (1917). Since all in
all 'very little systematic or formal writing on the subject' of education
survives from pagan Graeco-Roman sources, despite the importance
which Antiquity attached to it, Colson deems it 'strange to find one of
the most vexed questions of classical antiquity most fully discussed in
the work of this semi-hellenized Jew [i.e. PhiloJ-to find the old issue
between the sophist and the philosopher stated to us in terms of the
Old Testament.'33
However, it is not strange at all if Philo is determined to guard the
Jewish youth against the influence of the sophist movement. Indeed, as
Winter writes in reply to Colson's statement: 'If it is strange (as F.H.
Colson maintains), it is also highly informative that Philo evaluated the
Alexandrian sophistic tradition by means of OT incidents imported into
the structure of Plato's critique.'34Winter's emphasis, however, is on
the final part of the sentence, 'OT incidents imported into the structure if
Plato's critique', and it seems he takes Philo's evaluation of the sophistic
tradition 'by means ifOT incidents'almost for granted. What Winter sets
out to demonstrate and clarifYin response to Colson is Philo's Platon-
izing tendency, not his use of narratives from the Mosaic Pentateuch.
Mter quoting Colson, Winter continues: 'Although Philo conducts his
discussionof the sophistic tradition within a framework of OT characters
and texts, we will see that his critique of it depends heavily on Plato's
evaluation of the sophists'.35However, it may also be informative that
Philo criticizes the sophistic tradition 'by means of OT incidents' if he
is indeed trying to warn the Greek-educatedJewish youth. If that is the
case, warning them through anti-sophistic commentaries on the Mosaic
Pentateuch is far more effective than through general treatises.
Occasionally Winter seems to be aware of this anti-sophistic function
of the Old Testament narratives. Commenting on De migratione Abrahami
76-85, where Philo states that 'all the arguments of the sophists are
devoured and done away with' by the rhetorically giftedAaron, the logos
prophorikos, the 'Finger of God', Winter states: 'This narrative functions
as a divine rescript which declares that "sophistry is ever defeated by
33 F.H. Colson, 'Philo on Education', Joumal qf77zeological Studies 18 (1917) 151-62,
esp. 151, 153, 162, with quotation from 162.
34 Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, 94.
35 Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, 80.
wisdom"'.36Here, Winter explicitly reflects on the function which Philo
attributes to a particular Old Testament narrative. Similarly, later on
Winter argues that 'Philo's war against contemporary sophistic activity
was an outworking of' his high esteem for Moses as ''the wise man"
(1tavcro<po~),exceeding in age and wisdom even the Seven Wise Men
of the Greeks', in congruence with the rhetorical question posed by the
Greek philosopher Numenius: 'What else is Plato, but Moses speaking
Attic Greek?'37Consequently, according to Winter, Philo 'believed that
conflicts in which noted OT characters engaged provided the paradigm
for his evaluation of the sophists'.38
I agree with this and believe that the narrative emphasis of the
present paper, which focuses on the Old Testament narrative contexts
of the polemic concerning the sophists in Philo's oeuvre, shows abun-
dantly that there is an uninterrupted anti-sophistic reading of these
narratives in Philo's commentaries, spanning the entire line from the
creation to Moses. The scale and scope of this undertaking suggests
that Philo deliberately chose the Mosaic Pentateuch as the vehicle to
convey his warning to the Greek-educated Jewish youth concerning
the dangers of the anti-philosophical, social and political lures of the
sophist movement.
36 Winter, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists, 105.
37 On Numenius' view on Moses, see now M.F. Burnyeat, 'Platonism in the Bible:
Numenius of Apamea on Exodus and Eternity', in: G.H. van Kooten (ed.), The Revelation
qf the Name YHWH to Moses:Perspectives.fromJudaism, the Pagan Graeco-Roman World, and Early
Christianity (Themes in Biblical Narrative 9), Leiden: Brill, 2006, 139-68. On Graeco-
Roman views on Moses in general, see G.H. van Kooten, 'Moses/Musaeus/Mochos
and his God Yahweh, lao, and Sabaoth, Seen from a Graeco-Roman Perspective',
in: Van Kooten, The Revelation qfthe Name, 107-38.
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